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Preface
This collection of essays on Access to Civil Justice h ad its origins
in a conference, organised and funded by the Ontario M inistry of the
Attorney-General, in June, 1988. T his was part of a larger project begun
and inspired by the Honourable Ian Scott. The conference was attended
by a host of individuals and organisations from all over Canada and
elsewhere, including lawyers, politicians, bureaucrats, academics and
citizens. Generous additional funding was provided by The Law Foundation
of Ontario. Most of the essays were originally completed for publication
in 1989.
Many people contributed their hard work and d edication to ensuring
that the conference was a success. Especial thanks must go to Lorraine
G raham, Beth Boswell, John Gregory and Patrick Monahan. The
completion of this volume was made possible by the supportive efforts
of Jonathan Anschell, Corinne Doan, Richard Epstein and Carole Trussler.
October, I 990
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Making The Justice System Balance:
Beyond The Zuber Report
Frederick H. Zemans

1. INTRODUCTION

The civil and criminal j ustice systems rely on a highly individualized
dispute resolution process in which each litigant must both prosecute and
present his or her own case with limited intervention by the court system
and no direct involvement by the j udiciary. Neil Brooks has noted that
the adversarial system reflects the "political and economic ideology of classic
English liber alism in three ways: by its emphasis upon self-interest and
individual initiative; by its apparent distrust of the state; and, by the
significance it attaches to the participation of the parties." 1 Much of the
current discussion of access to j ustice is concerned with the inequities that
flow from the adversarial system along with a growing recognition that
participation of parties poses particular and difficult problems. Parties
with limited resources and with small or diffuse claims face the greatest
difficulties, especially when they are litigating against large organizations,
be they trade unions, corpor ations, or an arm of government.

2. THE ACCESS MOVEMENT
It is worth emphasizing that the adversarial system reflects an
individualistic, liberal view of society and grows out of the prevalent social
und political philosophy of Western society. Indeed, most lawyers would
u1guc th111 l hc foremost concern of the common law and the adversarial
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system is the protection of individual rights.2 Litigation is considered as
a means of determining disputes between two individuals or perhaps
between two business entities. Despite the generous expansion of
contemporary rules of procedure with respect both to joinder of parties
and to claims, judges and lawyers alike tend to perceive civil litigation
in terms of individuals and their individual causes of action. Thus, we
find opposition to reform of the law of civil procedure as it relates to
bringing class actions, despite various law reform studies that have been
undertaken, notably in this province.3 These studies have recommended
the liberalization of the possibilities for groups to litigate collectively, a
more activist role for the bench, the introduction of contingency fees,
and the abolition of the punitive provision that costs follow the cause
in class actions.
In framing the question of how to balance the justice system, we
acknowledge the implicit suggestion that there is in fact a justice "system"
and that it is in a state of imbalance. A recognition of the individualism
that underlies the adversarial system and the problems it creates can be
found in the federal government's recent review of the justice system, the
Neilson Report, which questions the coherence of the administration of
justice in Canada. The Report notes that, in addition to the disjointed
and individualistic nature of Canada's justice system, there are two
important, related issues:
The first has to do with the extent to which the participants in the system
as a who le arc interested in, or capable of, viewing their interaction in systemic
terms. The common Jaw tradition discourages systemic rationalization, and
this appears to have extended to not thinking about why relationships within
the system are as they are, or how they could be improved.
The second related issue is that historically there has been very little
empirical data about what is actually happening within the justice system.•
2 Ibid., at 98. Brooks quotes from the editorial page of a bar association journal to illustrate
this argument:
If you believe in the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition, that the individual is
the important unit of our society, and the state exists to serve him, then it seems
that the adversary system is preferable. If you hold a corporate view of society,
that is to say, that the community is the important unit, and that the citi1en must
be primarily considered as a part of the corporate unit, then it seems you should
champion the inquisitorial system.
3 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report 0 11 Class A N io 11s ( 1982).
4 Minister of Supply and Services Canada, The Ju.l'l ic£• S 1'.\ l l'l/1 Improved Prowr1111 /J('/ll'('fl"
A Study Team Report 10 1111! Neilson Tfl.1'k F o r n• 0 11 Program /?('1•i1•w ( 1986) 111 11.
and 13- 15. In discussing the j uMicc system, the wiitc1s 11olc that the hn kllfll'S w1th111
the justice system 111 c "ol 11 so111cwh11t tl•11111111s t•l111111t•tw· l11dl'l'd, ti ll' .ull111s111 11il ,
i11divid1111lislic llllll diM'l l'lin11111 y d1111111'll'I of I hl• lt•1.ull p1 oil''"" II 111i~• ht ut I lllll"• hr t ho11 ~ h t
to 111 ~ 1111111 1\' 11, rll 11110 thr d1s1rn11lt'tl 1l'111t1011•h1p' 11 1lhr 111 ~ t ll 11l 1nm p11 hl11 11 111 pll\nll
I hut .-n111pm1 t111 111 11 11111 ul t ha ·~ .11111 '
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To what extent are reforms appropriate? And will such reforms advance
values that we wish to codify and incorporate into the justice system?5
Should the state encourage class actions, and what are the appropriate
goals of such litigation? An analysis of the administration of justice must
evaluate the premises and philosophical underpinnings of legal aid,
contingency fees, and pre-paid legal services.6
I do not believe that we can embark upon a discussion of law,
substantive or procedural, as if legal issues could be considered in a political
vacuum. Richard Abel believes that much of the writing on legal aid (as
well as other areas of the common law and, in particular, procedural
discourse) is flawed by the insistence on divorcing law from politics. He
writes:
The prevailing ideology of advanced capitalism- liberal legalism - is grounded
on that very premise. The institution of legal aid itself attempts to fulfill
the promises of liberal legalism without first effecting any change in
fundamental political relationships. 7

Though l do not intend to undertake an analysis of the political philosophy
underlying the Canadian civil justice system, I urge that we confront the
fact that in each area of decision-making-class actions, legal aid, and
the independence of both the judiciary and the legal profession - the
determination of the approach or role to be assumed by a lawyer or a
judge is often a political, and seldom a value-free, decision.
The belated introduction in Canada of a state-funded legal aid scheme
is an historic example. The political reality is that neither the legal profession
nor any of the partners in Canadian federalism exhibited any significant
concern with respect to "access to justice" prior to 1967, when the Ontar~o
Legal Aid Plan was introduced. We can either criticize or praise the
"judicare" model of the mid-1960s, but despite the introduction of a legal
services model in the U.S., we opted for a combination of the English
and Scottish models of legal aid. The more fundamental issue is that,
until 1967, there was no political will to attempt to rectify the most egregious
wrongs within the adversarial system. Instead, in the best interests of the
5 Brooks, note I, above, at 98. Brooks makes the point that it is only recently that we
have come to recognize that procedure is not value free. He refers to the writings of
Cappelletti and Damaska. We can no longer attempt to right a system without attempting
to 11ntlcrM1111d the roots and origins of that system.
6 Note 4, 11bovc, at 13. ·1he hdcral Study Team on The Justice Sys1em acknowledges
th111 thc1 c is ta justice ,ystem but with very weak interrelationships between the participants.
" I has as hlTllllNc tlw1 c is no trndition ol doing so. nor is the re a generally held perception
111111 111111 1• systl·11111• tl1111k111µ 11ml lwtt1•1 i11loi 11111tion 11bo11t how one purt of the structure
11lk1 t• nth1·1., wn 11ld lw l11•lpl11I " lrl
\111 I I .1w W11h1111t 1'1111111" I 1p11l l\11l lla11h1 \d \'11111 r d < 11p11 11 l1"11" (1Q R~) l2 U,C I ./\.
I tl o' 11 t .at l/h IH\
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dominant elements in Canadian society, the myth was perpetuated that
all citizens have a right to have their disputes dealt with by their court
system.
Lawyers, as well as law students, were as aware in the 1960s as we
are today that our court system is slow, that it is expensive, and that
courts are not where the average citizen has his or her disputes or conflicts
resolved. In the 1960s, our country was coming of age. We recognized
that we had the opportunity to develop certain unique aspects of the social
contract - particularly medical care- but there was little or no concern
on the part of the public or its elected representatives for legal care. Going
to law was not equated with going to the hospital. Health care was
considered to be a basic human necessity, while legal care was considered
to be a luxury to be enjoyed, or rather endured, only when absolutely
necessary, for example, in the context of a divorce or perhaps a motor
vehicle accident claim.
Are Canadians today interested in analyzing the systemic problems
of the administration of justice? The Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry,a
written in 1987, gives a qualified but important "yes" and offers a significant
analysis of the justice system as a whole, in addition to its well-publicized
recommendations as to court jurisdiction and court administration. In
his analysis of the justice system, M_r. Justice Thomas Zuber accepts the
challenge of addressing the administration of justice as a coherent whole.
His report sets out the general principles to be applied in assessing the
justice system and recommending reform. 9 Perhaps the most significant
element of this report is its strong articulation of the responsibility that
the court system and the administration of justice owe to the Canadian
public. Zuber states that the "court exists to serve the public. Lawyers,
judges, court registrars and court clerks all serve the justice system," which
in turn, according to the author, exists for the benefit of the public:
This Inquiry would go a step further and state emphatically that not only
counsel should be cast in a social service role, but that the entire court system
has a purpose only to the extent that it serves the community.10

8 Zuber, R eport of the Ontario Courts Inquiry ( 1987).
9 Ibid. , at 66-70. Courts grew out of the social necessity to provide n way of resolving
disputes that did not threaten the fabric of society. The courts con tinue to exist because,
despite their problems, the people have confidence in the integrity uncl wi~dom of the
court, and they continue in times of stress to turn to the cou1 t fo1 the vind icntion ol
their rights.
10 //1111., !It 66-70. Thl· Rl·po1t ndoptk t h~ 11 pp1011d1 ol thl' noted A111rtit•1111 11111n·d u111llst,
A1th111 I . V11ntll'1h1lt, 1111tl llS~t· rt \ thl' 1111h1 nl t'V\'IV 11111-111111 Ill II prn111pt 11111l 1•ll11'ir11t
11 i11l 1111111·11M11111hh- rnwl 1111tl le• 1 <'p11 ·~1·1u11 tiu11 hy <'n1t1p1•t1·1J1 l11wv1•1'
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Committed to the vindication of the rights of individuals, the classic
liberal values embodied in the Canadian adversarial system are perceived,
with some legitimacy, as being opposed to community or communitarian
values. In the chapter entitled "General Principles Underlying Court
Reform," Zuber affirms the responsibility of the justice system to the
community, taking our discussion well beyond the traditional "access to
justice" concerns of economic accessability and delay. By articulati ng the
straightforward premise that the justice system exists not only for the
benefit of lawyers or judges or for individual litigants, but for the public
benefit, the report has offered Canadians a unique analysis of the provision
of civil justice. 11 The Zuber Report challenges its readers to develop models
of analysis that broaden our understanding of how the justice system affects
the various socio-eonomic communities that make up contemporary
Canadian society. In acknowledging that the courts and the administration
of justice must serve the community, Zuber's report raises a clear challenge:
the important requirement is to understand the needs of the communities
that the justice system is serving.
This paper accepts the major findings of the Zuber Report, that is,
the inefficiency, the costliness, and the lengthy delays of the administration
of justice. Tn considering these concerns and Zuber's recommendations,
I analyze in some detail two approaches- one private and one publicto these issues. Similar analysis would be beneficial when considering the
implications of contingency fees, lawyers' advertising, and the use of
paralegals and non-lawyers in providing traditional, case-by-case, legal
services and more broadly-based community education and development.
The challenge remains for Canadian sociologists of law to study and analyze
the extent to which the administration of justice has fulfilled its obligation
as articulated by the Zuber Report of serving and responding to the diverse
needs of our community.
Access to justice is a concept that has only recently come of age
in Canada. It is, in many ways, surprising that law and particularly the
justice system was so belatedly perceived as a legitimate social service.
11 An holistic approach, which attempts to approach civil justice issues from the perspective
of a social service that responds to the needs of its community, will require a new framework
for analysis. If the fundament al values of the j ustice system are moved from an
individualist ic aprroach to a more collectivistic approach, the role of judges and lawyers
in th<: administration of justice-courts and legal services - must be reconsidered.
('e r Lu inly, the significant involvement of citizens' groups in the administration and "control"
ol k1111I scr vices for 1111 classes of society would seem appropriate. As well, the opportunity
Im 11 11 11· l 11wym~ lo p111t 1dp111c 111 the i11s1kc system as the "deliverers" of Lhc service,
kll<'h llN l'11111111111u1 y lt11111 I wen kt•r, w1t l11 11 11111 l'1 111 ic- systt:m 0 1 11dvocutcs und conveyancers
111 th1• p11111111· ~ntc11, wu11ld h11n 1 11 ht•11•1•1111~1th•H·d lfl1111 th1· pc1sp1•1·1 1w ol thc funders
1111 111 •1111 illl h1'll'l11 1111cl 111011 1111pu11 111ctl y !he lll'!'tl~ nl llrl' p11 hh~·
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The history of the access movement and particularly of legal aid has yet
to be written, but it is generally agreed that public awareness of the need
for legal aid services dates only to 195 1. 12 The Ontario Legal Aid Plan
was introduced to assist indigent persons with defence representation in
serious criminal matters on a voluntary basis. But, as indicated, the social
policy commitment to legal aid had to await the Attorney General of
Ontario's Task Force on Legal Aid, which in 1965 recommended that
the English judicare and the Scottish duty counsel systems be introduced
to Ontario under the administration of the Law Society of Upper Canada
and funded by the province.13
Writing in the introduction to Access to Justice and the Welfare State,
Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth reiterate the concern that has been
expressed by many scholars who have studied and written about recent
attempts to develop justice systems that are responsive to the needs of
particular local and national societies:
"Access to justice" implies continuing social development, involving a constant
debate about how much access to provide and how much and what kind
of justice should result.14

Formal, rule-oriented attempts to provide equality of access have
generally been found inadequate. In practice, they have amounted to denials
of effective entry to, and use of, the court system, rather than providing
more preventative legal services. It is likewise true that access to traditional
models of dispute resolution- particularly the court system- is obtainable
only at a relatively high cost. This is particularly the case if such access
reforms are confined, as has been the case in Canada, to subsidizing lawyers
and to using traditional judicial approaches. T he pressure of costs for
legal a id, judicial appointments, new court houses, and for the
ad ministration of justice generally, especially in times of strained
governmental budgets, militate in favour of "wholesale justice," 15 which
may in turn come only at the expense of the quality of justice. Two
contemporary attempts to overcome the inequities of the Canadian justice

12 T he Ontario Legal Aid Plan was introduced in 1951 with the rassing of ·1he Law Society
Amend ment Act, S.O. 195 1, c. 45, which enabled the I.aw Society ol Upper Canada
to establish a voluntary scheme to provide legal aid .
I ~ Sec l?eporr of Joi111 Co111111111et• 011 f,egal A 1d ( 1965).
14 <'llflllllCll i & Garth, "Acres~ 10 .Justice and thl' Wl·llarc Sl!ltc: An l11 11od11l'l 1CH1," rn
C'11 r1wlil't1i , ed., 11l'n'.1".1 / 11 J11.1·t l1·c and llw W1•lfi11·1• S11111• (I 9K I ) 111 2
I ~ Thul , ill I ; ('uh1hn·si, "/\('('I''' lo h1klr\'l' l1lld S11 h~t 1111t1Vl0 l11 w l(d111111 11•11111 Aid101
thl' I OWt l M11hll1• ( 111 ~' .. Ill ('1111p\'lh-tt1 .'ii ( 1111111 n l ~ .. ln1•11 '" .f111//11' I 1111·11111111
(11111•11t1t1l f'1'1\fll'I I/I'< I \Ill I ( 11171)) tll lh'I
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system will be discussed in this article: pre-paid legal services, and legal
aid services. Both innovations await a more detailed and systematic analysis.

3. PRE-PAID LEGAL SERVICES
Pre-paid legal service is perhaps the most significant comprehensive
alternative to fee-for-services to develop in Canada during the 1980s. By
paying a fixed premium, either personally or in concert with his or her
employer, a subscriber, generally a middle-income earner, is entitled to
certain legal services free of charge when required.16 As with any insurance
scheme, all participants pay a premium that is fixed on the presumption
that only a limited number of subscribers will require legal services.
Pre-paid legal services schemes have existed in the United States for
nearly two decades but have only begun to be developed in Canada during
the last few years. By the early 1980s, pre-paid services were becoming
popular with American workers and were being requested as a fringe benefit
by their unions, the most extensive being developed by the United Auto
Workers (U.A.W.) for employees of General Motors, American Motors,
and Chrysler. As well, one of the major American chains of private legal
clinics (Hyatt Legal Services) began to provide pre-paid legal insurance
to a union around the same time but was not initially prepared to provide
pre-paid legal services to the general public as it was not considered
economically viable. 17 I underline that legal services plans in the United
States have grown both in numbers of subscribers and in services provided.
They are being marketed by a large number of the major insurance
companies as well as by direct mail organizations such as Diners Club,
Visa, and Mastercard. 18 The growth in both the market and models of

16 Wydr7ynski, "The Development of Prepaid Legal Services in Canada," in Evans &
Trebilcock, eels., Lawyers and 1he Consumer Interest: R egulating the Market for Legaf
Services ( 1982). Legal services plans are designed to create a risk a nd cost-sharing or
cost-spreading arrangement on the premise of "collective acquisition of legal services
to bcncltt the whole." See also Wydnynski, "Access to Legal Services: Prepaid Legal
Services" (unrublishecl paper rresented to the Conference of Canadian Law and Society
Assn., I l11 111i ltun, 1987).
17 W111tt•1, " More WM~c r s Gni11i11g l'rcp11id Lcg<rl Insurance" (1982) 68 Am. B<rr Assn.
I I ~~ 1 1. I 11 S1•p1t·111hr1 I 9X2, 11 yu tl I .cg:rl Sci vices agreed to provide rre-p11id legal insurance
to !Ill' Sh,•1•1 Ml'tul W111 ~l'l s 11111·111111 1011111 Assn. covering over 6,000 sheet metal workers
111111 1111·11 I 111111111'\
IH 1111111 N111<11~11111111 l1111lwl1m"ll'lll-ll·ll'11lrl 1.m1·1·1•>111 lh
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legal services is being generated by employee groups and, it would seem,
by the public as well. '9
The first private Canadian legal services plan was created in 1978;
it was a prepaid, open-panel scheme through the United Grain Growers
Services of Winnipeg. In the same year, the Prepaid Legal Services Program
of Canada, a resource centre to provide information and to conduct research
on pre-paid legal services in Canada, was established in Windsor. In spite
of these early developments, growth of pre-paid programs in Canada has
not kept pace with their growth in the United States. The reasons are
clear: provincial law societies have not encouraged (and in some instances
have discouraged) pre-paid legal services, the federal and provincial
governments have not exhibited any commitment, and consumers do not
seem to have perceived a need. In 1980, the Canadian Labour Congress
condemned the schemes as "make-work" plans solely for the benefit of
lawyers.20
Though pre-paid and legal insurance had been discussed for more
than a decade, it was not until the United Auto Workers' (now Canadian
Auto Workers (C.A. W.)) 1984 agreement with General Motors that a large
work-force was brought within a private legal services plan in Canada.
When the C. A. W. included the same provisions in its contracts with Ford,
Chrysler, and Navistar (formerly [nternational Harvester), it became
apparent that with over 75,000 union members in Ontario and Quebec,
each receiving approximately $60 per year from his or her employer,
approximately 4.5 million new dollars were about to be expended annually
on such legal services. Although these funds are small in comparison to
federal and provincial expenditures on legal aid, they are nonetheless
significant and were recognized by the organized legal profession to be
the tip of the legal insurance iceberg.
Confrontation and eventual litigation between The Law Society of
Upper Canada and the C.A.W. Plan did not arise out of consideration
of the needs of union members. Rather, the dispute arose because the
governing body was concerned about whether the Plan would be closed,
19 Ibid., at 16. Taub further suggests that one of the reasons that there has been such
a significant increase in the growth of legal services plans in the U.S. is that "they might
create a better public image and more business for the increasing numbers of American
lawyers."
Not long ago, you had to be a member of a major labour union 10 be eligible
for a prepaid legal services plan. In recent years, however, the number of nva ilnblc
plans has increased significantly, and another mujor cx p1111sio11 is in1111i1w11l. I hONl'
who market legal services plans arc going ultc1 1ht• i11tlivid1111I co11s1111w1 1111d ii
!heir plans sell. 111111111cys may g11 i11 not o nly 11w1<· h11si1wss, h111 11lso n lwllt·1 p11hl1t
illlll/\l',
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using "salaried" lawyers, or open, offering freedom of choice to use private
practitioners as well as staff lawyers. The Law Society opposed the
requirement that all private lawyers who accept work for plan members
must agree to become co-operating lawyers and be paid at the proposed
fee schedule of $60 per hour. 21 In some respects, the confrontation between
Ontario's Law Society and the C.A.W. Legal Services Plan was similar
to that which arose 15 years earlier from attempts by the Ontario Legal
Aid Plan to thwart salaried clinic lawyers, and specifically Osgoode Hall
Law School's Parkdale clinic. In both instances, while the issues were
couched in terms of the right of consumers of legal services to freedom
of choice, the heart of the matter was a concern by the profession to
preserve the private, individualized model of legal services that had
characterized lawyers' services for the better part of two centuries. New
funding of legal services was encouraged by the professional leadership
as long as the private practitioner remained the model of delivery and
control rested with the profession.22
As with salaried legal aid lawyers, the profession ultimately recognized
that the C.A.W. plan should continue to operate2J using salaried staff
lawyers and either co-operating lawyers in private practice who had agreed
to the $60 hourly fee or non-co-operating lawyers who could extra-bill
the Plan member. This model was accepted by the representatives of the
C.A.W. Plan to avoid litigation and to allow the Plan to grow. As with
the medical profession, the question of extra-billing of professional fees
rather than the quality or type of service was the source of tension.
Although there is limited statistical data, the C.A. W. Legal Services
Plan appears to have been successful in encouraging use of the plan by
union members and their families and by retirees. There is a usage rate

21 It is significant that by November 1985, the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper
Canada wrote to the originators of the C.A.W. plan and to the legal profession stating
that participation in the plan might constitute unprofessional conduct. See letter from
Pierre Genest to U.A.W. Canadian Legal Services Plan, November l , 1985, which was
circulated to all lawyers on the rolls of the Law Society of Upper Canada. A press
report, later in 1985, noted that lawyers could be "suspended or disbarred from practice
where such conduct is found." See Inside Business (28 December 1985).
22 lhe Legal /\id Committee of The Law Society of Upper Can ada, Community Legal
Sl'rVICl'S ( 1972).
23 I i1ig111ion ccn~cd after an agreement between the C. /\.W. and the Law Society of Upper
('111111<111 w11~ rl'llchcd in Muy of 1987. 'I he agreement allows 1he plan to operate so as
10 ollt•1 11111011 llll"lll hl11S llrt• nppoil1111i1 y 10 choose from eit her staff lawyers or outside
h1wv111s ll 111ww1, tlrllM' 1111·111ht· 1N wlro N~ll·t· 1 1111 outside luwycr that docs not limi l his
111 hr1 I rr~ tn 11n1111i1111n• wilil llrr pl1111 will n11lv hr H't1t 1 b111~rd 111 !ht· 11111011111 M'I 0111
111 1111 pli111", h 1 ~· hrd11lr 'il'I· I 1111111111111 /'11 ·11 N1•111/1 1 ( 1•1 ~ t 11\ 1'18/)
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of 44.8% in 1987, and 43.0% in 1988.24 Of interest is the comparative
use of staff and private lawyers during the Plan's early years:
1986

Staff
Co-operating
Non-cooperating
Notary
Total

1987

%

Isl Quarter 1988

Cases
17,873
9,806
7,960

51.2
25.2
22.8

Cases
18.014
8,447
8,027

51.8
24.3
23.0

278

.8

301

.9

77

.8

34,917

100

34,789

JOO

10,099

100

%

Cases
5,659
2,305
2,058

%
56.0
22.8
20.4

The division of lawyer use has remained equal between the staff lawyers
and the co-operating and non-co-operating lawyers, with some indication
that there may be a gradual increase in staff lawyer use. The distribution
of work between co-operating and non-co-operating lawyers remains
unclear at this early stage of the Plan's development. 2 s The Plan's caseload
is divided between wills and estates (33%); real estate, including real estate
litigation (37%); family law (15%); and other litigation, such as landlord
and tenant, motor vehicle, consumer, administrative law and criminal ( 15%).
Whether the Plan's members are using legal services for the first time
or to a greater extent remains to be examined. The initial data from the
C.A.W. Plan indicates a higher rate of use than in the United States U.A.W.
Plan, which currently averages a user rate of 38%. The relative newness
of the Canadian plan and limited available data does not alJow us to
determine the extent to which the plan is providing "advice only" or actually

24 This data was received in correspondence from the Executive Director of C.A.W. Legal
Services Plan to the writer, dated 7 June 1988. Usage is calculated as follows:
100/ l x (number of active employees + number of retirees)/ number of cases opened
per year = usage %.
25 Although the caseload is higher during the first quarter of 1988, as is the use of staff
lawyers, the figures are similar to those of the first quarter of 1987, when staff lawyers
received 54.3% of the cases and non-co-operating lawyers 21.7%. Similarly, u~age rates
were higher during the first quarter of 1987, at 49.2%, as compared to 50.1% for 1988.
The significance of the increased use during the first months of the ycu1 us well us the
choice of staff lawyers with increased cim: louds uwaiti. fu1thc11 cst,111ch 1111d 111111lvs"·
C. A.W. l.cg11J Services Plun is opcrnti11g Nt·vc11 staff offo:cs, with Nix 111 0111111111,
und one in Quebec. As nf .lunr I 'II<~. t h1·11· wnk 11 tot11l ol I09 ~ 111plov1•1·~. IO 111 wh11111
Wl' H' ln wy1· 1 ~ . Only two l11wy1•1s 111 c 111 vulwrl wit h 11d1111111~t111t 1 011 111 tl11 ht 11rl 111111 1•
wl11lr JH J nwvn~ 1111 l11111t1·1l 111 th1\l' V<11~1. 111 11 11111 '\

handling and completing matters. 26 The high percentage of wills may suggest
that many users of the Canadian Plan are using necessary legal services
that had previously been considered too expensive.
In response to the considerable publicity and interest in the C.A.W. 's
plan, three insurance companies in Ontario announced in 1986 that they
were preparing legal insurance schemes, and one offered a truncated form
of legal insurance that provided all-hours legal advice by phone to policy
holders.21 As welJ, the Law Society of Upper Canada, in conjunction with
the Ontario branch of the Canadian Bar Association, was investigating
the possibility of making available its own plan, which was intended to
provide broader coverage than the C.A.W.'s plan.2s
The principal benefit of pre-paid plans is the increased access to the
justice system that they offer through some degree of equalization of the
availability of professional services. Citizens who would not seek legal
services have the opportunity, through the limited, fixed individual costs,
to consult a lawyer. Thus the decision to consult a lawyer is made on
perceived needs and professional advice rather than the client's ability to
purchase legal services. The extent to which the pre-paid model will deliver
reasonably-priced legal services in Canada remains unclear, but we have
confirmed that salaried legal aid service is generally less expensive than
that provided by private lawyers delivering comparable services. 29 With
the services becoming routine, economies of scale, the use of paraprofessionals, computerized practices, and lower overheads, it may be safe
to predict that pre-paid will also be a less expensive delivery model than
the private bar. As Wydrzynski has written,
prepaid legal service plans do not provide coverage for every conceivable
legal problem which could arise. Control of costs is critical to plan survival
and benefits must be geared to the financial reality of the plan. While the
benefits must correspond to the members' needs, extravagant legal service
must necessarily be excluded. Thus, most plans provide coverage .for routine
legal services only: those needs which are most likely to be encountered by
the middle-class consumer (e.g. purchase and sale of real property, drafting
of a wi ll, family law matters, etc.) Benefits are tailored to the members' perceived
needs, and then usually only those services which are capable of cost controJ.30

26 During the first 15 months of its operation, 52,000 files were opened, and more than
half of all eligible employees used the services of the plan. The average annual usage
has been greater than that for similar plans for auto workers in the United States, which
cur rr11Lly 11verngcs about 38%.
27 C'111wfo1d, " B1 c11k Out in Upper C11nnd11" (1986) 10 Can. Lawycr 4 al 22.
21< //11r/ , 111 Ill
21J S1·1· C'1111ml11111 11111 Ass n N111 1011n l I 1·11111 Aul I 1111Nnn C'u111111illcc, l ~·gnl Aid f)<'fiw•rv
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Pre-paid schemes embody a relatively straightforward concept of risksharing. By spreading the cost of individual legal services across a broad
cross-section of society, legal costs become more affordable for the majority
of Canadians. As the plans are privately funded by employer, and sometimes
by employee contributions, or by insurance companies, various designs
with various services can be developed and marketed. Although the
organized legal profession remains committed to monitoring and, perhaps,
in some instances, to controlling pre-paid developments, both the
confrontation between proponents of the C.A. W. Plan and the Law Society
of Upper Canada and the resolution of this confrontation indicate that
attitudes are changing. With appropriate endorsement by government and
a commitment by pre-paid plans to provide legal services at a reasonable
cost, the organized legal profession has accepted the inevitability and the
utility of pre-paid group legal plans. Although the legal profession may
attempt to thwart new access models on the grounds of limited choice
of counsel or on the basis that fees offered to private practitioners are
considered too low, such opposition is futile and counter-productive in
the face of the growing success of the C.A.W. Plan and the recent
endorsement of pre-paid plans by the federal government.31 Diana Majury
wrote in 1981 that
The most valuable tool for public education in this area will be the existence
of successful legal service plans, responding to the presently unmet legal needs
of middle and lower income Canadians. Once one or two major plans are
operational in Canada, the advantages of this new delivery system will be
more readily apparent.32

1 suggest that, by the mid- I990s, group pre-paid and insurance plans
will be a recognized and well-established element in the panoply of legal
services offered in Canada. The extent to which these plans will assist
in providing less costly legal services to middle-income consumers is unclear,
but undoubtedly they will provide an affordable vehicle for the purchase
of legal advice and assistance with respect to certain "typical" legal problems.

4. LEGAL AID SERVICES
Much has been written about the phenomenal growth of legal aid
31 Note 4, above, at 202, where, in a discussion of the federal government's responsibilities

with respect to legal aid, the authors of the study write:
ln the case of the working poor, considcrntion ~ h o 11ld be given to wh1:thc1 11 101111
of govcrn 111cnt-subsicli7cd prc-puicl lcg11I sc1viccs might he nduptcd to 11lctt tl ll' n
lcgAI needs.
12 M 1\j111 y, " Int o the 1·111 ol P1 ~1p11icl l~·x1 il S1• 1 vi('(·~" (l'IXI) ~ ( '1111. ( '11111111111111 v I ' I. •I'
Ill i\(•

services in Canada and much of the Western world during the last several
decades. The governing bodies and the professional organizations of
Canadian lawyers have exhibited a growing interest in legal aid matters
since the creation of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan in 1967. The provincial
law societies have attempted to administer the legal aid plans through
committees generally composed of lawyers. In provinces where such direct
control has been opposed by the provincial government, the law societies
have nevertheless sought, and have generally obtained, a significant and
dominant voice in the administration of legal aid plans while simultaneously
asserting their members' claims to adequate payment for legal assistance.
The organized legal profession's intentions and attitudes toward the
various provincial legal aid plans have often been unclear. It has been,
and remains, my opinion that the Canadian legal profession's positive
response to government-funded legal aid grew out of the stimulation of
employment and the provision of a significant source of income for the
growing number of young lawyers. As well, the system's attractiveness
was increased by the profession's enhanced public image in providing funded
legal aid assistance to some of the country's impoverished. Although it
is rather late in arriving, the support of the legal profession can no longer
be doubted. The Canadian Bar Association, in the report of its National
Legal Aid Liaison Committee, is forthrightly assertive in its advocacy on
behalf of legal aid services in this country:
Legal aid is not an expensive social experiment, affordable only in times
of economic growth. Rather, it is the expression of the basic, democratic
principle of the protection of the rights of individuals against the overwhelm ing
power of the state. As such, legal aid is essential in order to ensure equal
access to justice in our society. Justice is indivisible; if it is not accessible
to everyone then it does not exist.33

The commitment of the organized profession to legal aid services
cannot be underestimated in terms of its impact on the development of
similar funding commitments by the federal and provincial governments
to enhanced funding. Nonetheless, the Canadian legal profession remains
wary of salaried lawyers and continues to perpetuate a rather narrow
perspective on legal aid services as confined to individualized claims handled
as far as possible by lawyers in a similar fashion to those of their private
clientelc. Two recent studies, one by the federal government and one by
the Canadian Bar Association, have acknowledged that legal aid has become
a component of the social services network in Canada and that such services
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are provided by the public sector as well as the private sector and generally
at a lesser cost. The analysis of federally-funded services by the Neilson
Task Force creates a cost-effectiveness back-drop to contemporary
discussions of legal services. While recognizing the commitment of federal
resources to legal aid, the Report is written in the minor key of "restraint":
The justice system is at a turning point for a wide variety of reasons. Principally
these have to do with the stresses inherent in operating overburdened , costly
institutions in times of restraint, and the advances that have been made in
making the law and the institutions that give effect to it more reflective of
the principle of social equity.34

I will return to the question of restraint and its impact on legal aid
services, but let us briefly examine the legal aid structure that has been
erected by the provinces with considerable financial assistance from the
federal government during the last two decades. In l 984-85, $182.1 million,
or $7.22 per capita, was expended on legal aid. On an inflation-adjusted
basis, the national per capita expenditure on legal aid declined slightly
in 1984-85, following minimal increases in the two previous years.35 Per
capita expenditures on legal aid vary significantly from province to province,
with Quebec at $9. 17 having the highest provincial per capita expenditure,
and Prince Edward Island having the lowest, with a per capita expenditure
of $1.55.36 As well, the fluctuation in provincial legal aid expenditures
varies from year to year. The national per capita expenditures decreased
by 3% during 1984-85 on an inflation-adjusted basis; the most notable
decreases were reported in New Brunswick (down 14%), Ontario and
Manitoba (both down 6%), and British Columbia (down 10%).
Although the provinces are charged with responsiblity for the
administration of justice-a fact that has allowed a diversity of legal aid
plans to develop in Canada- the federal government has a growing financial
investment in legal aid plans. Commencing in the early 1970s, the federal
government agreed to fund appro ximately 50% of criminal legal

34 Note 4, above, at 11.
35 Statistics Canada, Legal Aid in Canada (1985) Figure 4, at 129. In constant dollars,
per capita expenditures on legal aid rose from $7. 19 in 198 1-82, to $7.36 in 1982-83,
to $7.43 in 1983-84, to fall back to $7.22 in 1984-85.
36 Ibid. Figure 3, at 129. 1984-85 per capit a ex penditures on legal 11id n1111-1ed from Eustcrn
provincial lows of: P.E. I., at $ 1.55; Newfoundland , at $2.43; New ll11111 ~wic k , 111 $2.H l;
and Nova Scot ia. at $4. 12; to Central Cam1dn. 11hovc the n11ti11nul 11vr1111-1t•, w11h Q11t•ht'l'.
at $9. 17; Ontario, al $7.77 and Mnn ito lm, 111 $7.79; 1111d till' 1'111i11t· 1'1 ov111t'"' • l1phtly
below tlw 111111011111 nvl·11111c with S11•~11tl'ht•w1111, 111 !i\K\ /\lht•1t11, 111 'lt•l 110 1111d ll1111Hl1
( 'ol111nh111, 111 :Ii~ 7'1 .
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expenditures.37 As the cost of legal aid has escalated, the provinces have
expressed dissatisfaction with the criminal legal aid cost-sharing formu la,
which has seen the federal contribution fall to approximately 46% of
national criminal legal aid costs. 38
T he costs of civil legal aid are shared under the Canada Assistance
Plan (C.A.P.) as an "item of special need," provided to persons defined
as "needy" under the "assistance" provisions of the scheme. C.A.P. has
become a vehicle for underwriting the cost of provincial legal aid programs
on an open-ended basis, resulting in substantial financial advantages to
participating provinces. 39 The funding of civi l legal aid under C.A.P. was
approximately $22 million in 1985.
The tension over fund ing and the rising costs of legal aid may have
temporarily abated pending renegotiation of the federal-provincial costsharing agreement in 1990, as well as the reduced emphasis on "cost per
case" by the federal government. But the current arrangements remain
in conflict with each other. The federal-provincial agreement with respect
to criminal legal aid attempts to impose minimum standards concerning
representation in criminal matters a nd has been criticized for its
ineffectiveness in this regard and for setting ceilings on the federal
contribution. The Canada Assistance Plan's fu nding of civil legal aid was
established by the Federal Department of Health and Welfare and has
been criticized for having no ceiling and no minimum standards.40 The

37 Note 4, above, at 198-200. Federal-provincial agreements respecting the provision of
criminal legal aid have been in place since 1972-73. Essentially, the agreements require
the "provincial agency" to provide legal aid to eligible applicants in all serious criminal
cases, that is, in all indictable offenses or in summary conviction matters where there
is likelihood of imprisonment or loss of means of earning a livelihood. Criminal legal
aid costs delivered by the provinces have grown from $11 million in 1973-74, to
approximately $90 million in 1985-86.
38 The provinces seek 50/ 50, open-ended cost-sharing in all areas of legal aid on the view
that the federal governme nt should "share the risk" in meeting the demand for legal
aid services created by the mandatory coverage requirements in the federal-provincial
agreement.
39 Note 33, above, at 20. The Report notes the open-ended basis of the C.A.P. funding
of civil legal aid and expresses concern about the open-ended funding of provincial civil
legal aid without a ny significant increase in service.
40 Ibid., at 20. The Report underlines that there arc currently three standing legal aid costshnring arrangements between the provincial and federal governments: the adult criminal
nncl Young Offenders /\ct rigrccmcn1 ncgol iatect by the Fcdernl J usticc Department with
lhl' 1'1 ov1111:inl Ministries of' the A110111cy (icncnil; the C'unuda Assistance Plan (C.A. P),
1111dt·1 whwh 1111" h•1lt-111I lkp111J11w111 nl lknllh 1111d WclJ'111c h11s 1111rcctl lo share lhc
n 1~1 ul n v1l lrg11l 111d 111nv11kd lo Jhosr q1111hly111111111d1•1 111nv111ri11I sor inl wl'i ln n· d1g1hili1 y
11111·1111
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legal profession has queried whether, in responding to the federal funding
priorities, the provincial legal aid schemes have set their priorities based
on federal funding rather than on quality of services or community needs:
In responding to this confusion, some provinces have had to cut corners,
limit coverage and distort priorities in order to enhance or protect federal
recoveries. If services are to be cut, they will tend to be where there are
no minimum standards; if services are to be added, they will tend to be where
there are no payment ceilings. 4 '
The recent study of the National Legal Aid Liaison Committee of
the Canadian Bar Association, Legal Aid Delivery Models: A Discussion
Paper, attempts to clarify the ongoing debate in Canada concerning the
cost of legal aid. The paper's authors are critical of those studies that
compare provincial schemes on a "straight-cost" basis. Concern is expressed
that a straight-cost analysis of judicare or staff lawyer models ignores
the significant question of quality:
The flip side of cost is quality. Without holding quality constant across cases,
cost differences reflect little more than differences in quality. For example,
in a staff lawyer model, one can crank up the caseload per lawyer, with
an attendant drop in quality, and produce lower costs per case. Equally, in
a judicare model, one can depress the tariff, thereby reducing costs and likely
also quality.42
As with most legal aid systems in industrialized states, provincial legal
aid services in Canada are oriented toward representing clients involved
with the courts, and an attempt is made by most plans to compare the
legal aid recipient with the fee-paying client in determining whether services
should be given. In fact, legal aid schemes have continued to ignore the
differences between recipients of legal aid services and more typical users
of the legal system and have refused to acknowledge that "poor people
are not just like rich people without money" and that their socio-legal
problems are distinct.43
In two provinces, New Brunswick and Alberta, legal aid is delivered
exclusively by the judicare model, where all criminal and civil legal aid
services are delivered by private lawyers and the plans are administered
by a committee or board reporting to the provincial law society. In contrast,
Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island are at the other

41 /hid., at 20-2 1.
42 Noll' 29, ahow, 111 t1
'11 St•t• Wt'\ h•1, " 1'111r llrn11• l 11w l

end of the legal aid spectrum, with virtually all legal aid provided by
salaried lawyers.44
Jn the other provinces, various forms of the mixed delivery system
have developed. These models of legal aid have become known as "the
Canadian compromise" because of their mixing of the English judicare
with the American community-based salaried lawyer system. Judicare is
the dominant aspect of the mixed delivery model in Manitoba and British
Columbia, while in Quebec and Newfoundland, the proportions are reversed
with 60 to 70% of legal aid cases handled by staff lawyers. 45 Ontario has
a successful mixed delivery system, combining the judicare and clinic models
of service. Although it initially opposed community-based clinics with
salaried lawyers and a more broadly based welfare rights agenda, the
profession in Ontario has gradually come to accept the concept. There
are over 60 clinics in Ontario, operating with many of the features of
the original American welfare rights model of legal services. Some of these
clinics provide specialized legal services or serve specific constituencies such
as the elderly, tenants, or younger people. Community-elected boards of
directors have some authority to set both case criteria and eligibility
standards for their clinics, allowing the clinics to move beyond a totally
service-dominated program and to attempt to achieve a more reformoriented approach to the provision of legal services. As an auxiliary to
the established judicare scheme, the Ontario clinics have generally developed
a more strategic approach to legal services, and in many instances have
moved beyond a service model to become involved to some extent in
community education, community development, and some significant law
reform litigation.

In these provinces, private lawyer participation is generally restricted to mandated choice
of counsel required in capital cases and occasionally in conflict situations. Saskatchewan
and Nova Scotia have plans administered under a public legal aid commission, dominated
by government appointees, whereas P.E.1.'s plan is administered through its Department
of Justice.
45 Jn Manitoba and British Columbia, a mixed delivery system of judicare and staff lawyers
exists, with 70 to 75% of the cases handled by private lawyers. The B.C. model reflects
its historical and structural origins in a carefully balanced merger of the Legal Aid Society
and the Legal Services Society of British Columbia. The Manitoba scheme has evolved
in response to the changing political scenery of the province. The Legal Services
Commission of British Columbia is evenly balanced between Law Society and government
nominees, whereas Manitoba's plan, under the N.D.P. provincial government, had
government nominees predominate.
Quebec's 111ix1urc of cases handled by salaried and private lawyers is an outgrowth
ol llw f)lan·~ 1·111ph11sis ll11 snl111icd luwycrs working in local and regional bureaux.
N1·wl111111dl11111l 'N 1111x111n· 11ppl 111s lo huvt" ll'SlllH·d h olll l11111nci11l fncto1'>. Sec l.egal Aid
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Much of the recent academic literature as well as professional and
government analysis has focused on a comparison of the various ~odels
of legal services. Much of this literature has tended to be defensive ~r
argumentative, and very little sophisticated analysis has emerged. Yet 1t
is possible to state that a consensus seems to be emergi~g .in favo~r of
the mixed delivery model. The 1985 Canadian Bar Association National
Legal Aid Liaison Committee Report, "Patterns in Legal Aid," noted that
"in equivalent cases, staff lawyers generally provide similar s.ervices for
less. " This has been confirmed by provincial studies in Nova Scotia, Quebec,
and British Columbia. 46
A recent evaluation study of Manitoba legal aid found that, on average,
for most family cases, judicare lawyers take 50% longer. In criminal cases,
private practitioners take as much as 200% long~r than. their staff lawy.er
counterparts.47 The disparities are particularly noticeable m the first quartile
of case costs, with the staff lawyers' average being approximately onequarter of the cost of the private bar, which fact _rro~oked t~e eva~uator
to recommend changing the tariff structure to mrnuruze the mcenttve to
maximize time.48 It should be noted that the Manitoba study deals
46 The British Columbia Study, Burnaby Evaluation, Report lll (1981), analyzed the cost
of delivering criminal legal services under a salaried public defender system and concluded
that there is little difference in per unit cost of services whether provided by salaried
lawyers or through fee-for-service using lawyers in private practice. In contrast, The
Quebec study, Evaluation de /'Aide Juridique (1982), confirmed the cost-effectiveness
of the salaried model, which handled over two-thirds of the case load.
The Nova Scotia Legal Aid Evaluation Report (1983) at 277, fo und that the average
cost per case during 1981-82 was 143% higher for cases referred to the private bar than
for those taken by staff lawyers. This example, however, illustrates some of the problems
that arise from this kind of comparison. For one thing, it gives no indication of what
kind of cases were referred, which could have a significant impact on the actual case
cost. Furthermore, only 2% of the cases were referred to private lawyers, thus rendering
the two models virtually incomparable. See Legal A id Delivery Mod({ls: A Discussion
Paper, note 29, above, at 35.
47 Sloan, Legal Aid in Manitoba: An Evaluation Report (1987) at 2 11-2 19 and 8~-86.
Manitoba's evaluation found that clients who were self-described "winners" rate pnvate
Bar lawyers more highly than staff lawyers on quality-of-service indicators'. whil~ "losers"
were less critical generally of their staff lawyers than they were of thelf pnvate Bar
counterparts.
48 This differential was evaluated, ibid., at 202, by referring to the different att itude ol
private lawyers who were perceived to have a tendency to "hand-hold " thei1 clients,
taking care of even their non-legal needs, thus engaging in "~trutegic billing" by t 1c11t1 n~
the tariff as a minimum bill:
Jn the consultation phase, ltiwycrs indicated that uppcnsing clients nnd k1'l'l1i n11 tlwn1
ca lm resulted both in satisfactiun 011 the p111t ol the l'lil'lli 11nd 111 fl 1Wl ll11
1cprcscntntion... 11 It h, being ' "llACstcd hl'll' thnt "lrnhyN11t i1111" 111 "11111111 huld111~1"
111 \°IK'lltN IN1111 111l1tll( Ill lll)ll l'llil•lll Ill J)ll Vllll' Pl •ll'tlll', h11t I~ I I , .. ~~ l'llllllllllll li•1111111·
ul tlu p1 111·1111'' 111 \l,d l h1wyri.

exclusively with high-volume cases, comprising 55% of the total caseload.
The differential for low-volume cases appears to be more modest. 49
Recent legal aid evaluations have begun to grapple with the question
of the quality of legal aid services, recognizing that the cost-effectiveness
debate becomes a digression from the crucial discussion of the
democratization of legal services and the provision of appropriate legal
services to respond to the socio-economic needs of underprivileged and
low-income persons. Mary Jane Mossman wrote several years ago that,
To an extent, the focus on the cost-effectiveness has distracted fro m, rather
than contributed to a better understanding of legal aid objectives. Thus, rather
than questioning decisions about equality objectives or the appropriate
approaches to providing legal aid services, most legal aid efforts have been
directed to assessing models of delivering such services; and because both
salaried and private practice lawyers provide essentially similar services, the
focus on cost-effectiveness has been directed very narrowly indeed.50

T here is no doubt that the quality and models of legal services remain
significant issues for the funders and providers of legal services. An holistic
analysis of legal aid services would obviously attempt to ascertain the
attitude of the public and the communities served with respect to these
issues. Such analysis is only currently beginning to develop. 51

5. CONCLUSION
In examining the significant recent developments in Canada with
respect to access to justice, it becomes clear that issues of quantity and
quality are inevitably in tension and that similar tensions have been carried
forward to the more recent development of pre-paid legal services. We
find limited evidence that concern for community needs or the principles
articulated for the justice system by the Zuber Report have permeated
49 Note 29, above, at 46-47. It is particularly in high-volume cases that the staff lawyer
has an opportunity to take advantage of the economics of specialization. The average
experience for staff lawyers in Manitoba is nine years in practice, thus giving ample
opportunity to develop specialized knowledge and experience. This advantage is magnified
by the fact that staff casework is divided by department into areas of expertise.
50 Mossman. "Legal Aid in Canada" (unpublished paper presented to the 7th International
Congress on Procedural Law at Wurzburg, 1983) at 56.
5 1 The proposed evaluation of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan should give considerable insight
into the judicarc side of the plan . Unfortunately, very little research is being conducted
in the fi1 st evaluation of the Ontario plan to allow for real comparison between the
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the Canadian legal profession. The uneasy partnership that has existed
between government and the legal profession with respect to legal aid
and other new models of legal services continues. Though committed to
expanding government-funded legal aid, the profession provides only
limited pro bono services in an organized fashion, with British Columbia
being the exception to this generalization.
Despite concerns expressed about motivation, the ongoing support
of legal aid services by the Canadian legal profession has stimulated the
growth of federal and provincial funding. Today, the profession is active
in virtually all aspects of the development and administration of legal
aid. Within judicare jurisdictions, most regions have area committees that
are composed primarily of volunteer members, generaUy lawyers, who set
policy and deal with appeals. The provincial base of legal aid and the
active involvement of the provincial law societies has meant that the
profession has been vigilant about government's attempts to restrict funding
or to re-organize legal aid services. Canadian lawyers are committed to
the various models of legal aid that are subsidized by government and
would tolerate neither an attempt to dismantle the existing programs nor
a massive reduction of government funding, as was seen in the United
States in the early 1980s. Questions regarding the services that should
be handled by the developing access to justice schemes and the appropriate
model or models of legal services are far from settled. Debate as to whether
we should encourage private practitioners to provide the legal services
for previously unserviced members of Canadian society or whether we
should opt rather for the staff-and-clinic model of legal services continues
in light of government concern about escalating costs. Although some
balance appears to be developing between these extremes, tensions remain
between the goals of individual clients and a broad social justice agenda.
As we move forward into the era of the Charter and the implications
of its provisions, the issues of communal justice and social inequality cry
to be addressed. Canadians must clarify the role of a responsive, fully
funded, and expeditious justice system that is accountable to the Canadian
public within the contemporary welfare state.

